## 1NC

### Framework

#### The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation requires a predetermined subject—they over-determine the rez more than us by assuming debates are the ultimate arbiter of its value as opposed to a means to facilitate clash

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

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Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the high ground and creates a de facto monologue

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Decision-making skills outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. **Lundberg 10** Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### Deleuze

#### Their reading of sexual difference erases all of the people who do not fit within those arbitrary categories – they have literally made invisible thousands of intersex people – you should reject this rhetorical framing as a unique act of violence and exclusion

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Irigaray offers a trenchant critique of the patriarchal monoculture that fails to recognize sexual difference, and so represses women’s voices, bodies, and ways of being. But her recent focus on the duality of the sexes, and her apparent suspicion of multiplicity, lead to problems theorizing other forms of difference such as race, culture, and sexuality, and it may prematurely disqualify possibilities for imagining sexual difference beyond the magical “two.” Even Alison Stone’s recent revision of Irigaray, which attempts to reconcile her account of sexual duality with bodily multiplicity as a way of addressing the exclusion of intersex bodies in her work, still maintains the primacy of duality and in my view fails to address claims of multiplicity on its own terms. In what follows, I test the limits of Irigaray’s approach to sexual difference through a reading of Proust’s novel Sodom and Gomorrah, in which I develop a model of sexual difference based on an irreducible duality of sexual “parts,” both of which may be found in the same individual but that nevertheless relate to one another and so become meaningful only through the circulation of an incongruous third element or libidinal force that generates multiple forms of pleasure and fecundity. Proust’s novel opens with an extended comparison of a sexual encounter between two men to the fertilization of a rare orchid by a bumblebee; the men connect to the sexual difference in themselves and in the other through their mutual enjoyment of pleasure across a threshold of alterity that is as mobile and contingent as it is irreducible to sameness. In my reading, this scene from Proust suggests a flexible way of accounting for practices that complicate the sexual duality of male and female without dissolving it, but also without enshrining it in the figure of the heterosexual couple. As such, it promises to open new ways of theorizing sexual difference in contexts where “to be two” is simply not enough. Irigaray and the Limits of Sexual Difference Alison Stone’s recent analysis of Irigaray’s later work addresses precisely the concerns I have raised here about the relation between duality and multiplicity. In Stone’s reading, Irigaray is a realist essentialist, which means that she believes in a natural, irreducible, and really existing sexual duality.7 This duality has yet to find adequate cultural expression; under patriarchy, and even under certain forms of feminism, sexual difference is reduced to an explicitly neutral but implicitly masculine monoculture of humanity. For Stone, Irigaray’s concept of sexual difference is best understood in terms of different rhythms or temporalities such as expansion and contraction, which are linked in a process like breathing where “each pole, alternately, inhales and exhales air, so that the one expands while the other shrinks” (Luce 90). Female rhythms, like female sexual development, are depicted as irreversible and discontinuous; they are connected to cyclical processes in nature like the change of the seasons. Male rhythms, on the other hand, are characterized by homeostatic processes that hover around an ideal mean, building up tension and releasing it while maintaining a steady equilibrium. Stone locates these processes not only in sexed organisms but also in more diffuse natural processes like weather or the growth of plants; ultimately, she draws on German Romantic thought to fill in a more general account of male and female principles operating in all of nature (Luce 92–93, 138–43, 154–60, 193–215). Stone frankly acknowledges the limits and potential problems of Irigaray’s realist essentialism. It is simply not the case that every woman experiences her body in terms of irreversible cyclical rhythms, and the reason for this is not merely because our culture fails to give expression to innate female rhythms. Even in a feminist utopia, it is not clear that each and every woman would identify with Irigaray’s account of our “real” natures, nor is it clear that everyone who identifies as a woman would count as such for Irigaray. The conviction that there are two and only two sexes marginalizes an experience of bodily multiplicity that is just as phenomenologically real and compelling as the experience of sexual duality (Luce 85, 112–13). Irigaray’s repeated suggestion that the only genuine encounter with difference can happen between the two sexes enforces a heterosexual paradigm that marginalizes same-sex relationships (Luce 7, 48, 189–90, 221–22) and makes it impossible for Irigaray to account for intersex or transsexual bodies without characterizing them as aberrant or unnatural (Luce 49, 113–21).

#### The refusal to recognize people in-between gender and sexuality is an act of violence that reifies hierarchies

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The experiences of transgender individuals (hereafter ‘‘transgenders’’), those who do not conform to traditional gender identity binaries, raise compelling questions about the nature of socially defined identities. Does one’s identity in a category, such as gender, require that this identity be fixed in a particular body? What if one’s central experience of oppression is being forced to conform to a socially constructed identity category that one does not actually identify with? How do social workers empower and collaborate with individuals who have fluid identities? Transgender theory is a newly emerging theoretical orientation that encompasses the unique experiences of transgenders. Although previous essentialist approaches viewed social identities as fixed within the person, feminist and queer theories locate social identities in the conflict between social- and self-determinants. These approaches are incomplete for social work practice. If someone’s social identity is understood as being fixed or essential within the person, it can validate and **justify sex, racial, class, and other differences as being ‘‘natural**,’’ which can ultimately **reify the multiple systems of oppression**. At the same time, questioning and destabilizing all social identities disintegrates the individual’s sense of core self within a socially oppressed group, even though such an identity can be the basis for personal empowerment and empowerment to oppose social oppression. Transgender theory encompasses and transcends feminist and queer theory by explicitly incorporating ideas of the fluidly embodied, socially constructed, and self-constructed aspects of social identity, along with the dynamic interaction and integration of these aspects of identity within the narratives of lived experiences. Starting from feminist and queer theory approaches, this article discusses the evolution of transgender theory as an important next step to a more complete and inclusive understanding of gender and sexual identity. Suggestions are then provided for applying transgender theory to specific issues of understanding, working with, and empowering transgenders and building coalitions between transgender communities and other socially oppressed groups. Transgender and Transsexual Transgenderism can be defined as the breaking of gender roles and gender identity and/or going across the boundaries of gender to another gender (Green, 2004). Transgenders typically express gender identities outside traditional heteronormative definitions, but may have little or no intention of having sex-reassignment surgeries or hormone treatments (Bornstein, 1994). Transsexual individuals can be either pretransition/operative, transitioning/in the process of hormonal and surgical sexreassignment, or posttransition/operative (Hird, 2002). Transgenders differ widely in their degree of belief in the fluidity of gender identity. Some accept such fluidity only to the extent that one can switch between two otherwise separate, essentialist, and pure gender categories, whereas others believe that an embodied gender identity is still highly malleable. Lane (2009) noted the concern that transsexual voices may be silenced or ultimately erased under the umbrella of transgender. Concentrating on the artificiality of gender can de-emphasize the need for transsexuals to change their sexed bodies, which is central to a transsexual lived experience, thus excluding transsexual narratives in queer and transgender theories. \

#### The alternative is to become genderful – affirm gender as a rhizome and multiplicity to overcome our predetermined socio-biological roles

**Justaert 10** [Kristien Justaert, Doctorate, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, Issue 121 (Volume 39, Number 1), 2010, Liberation Theology, “Deleuze and Althaus-Reid”, Project Muse]

The Body without Organs¶ The body, for Deleuze and Guattari, is a 'discontinuous, nontotalized series of processes, organs, flows, energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal events, intensities, and durations' (Grosz, 1994: 193-4). Following Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with going beyond the confines of the mind/body dualism. The subject is not an 'entity', or a relation between mind (interior) and body (exterior). Instead the subject is understood in terms of a series of 'flows, energies, movements, and capacities, a series of fragments or segments capable of being linked together in ways other than those that congeal it into an identity' (Grosz, 1994: 198). They concentrate on the capabilities of bodies rather than by their genus and species or their organs and functions. To overcome the classical Cartesian mind/body dualism Deleuze and Guattari develop Artaud's conception of the Body without Organs (BwO) as:¶ an interface, a threshold, a field of intersecting material and symbolic forces. The body is a surface where multiple codes (race, sex, class, age, etc.) are inscribed: it is a linguistic construction that capitalises on energies of a heterogeneous, discontinuous, and unconscious nature.¶ (Braidotti, 1994: 169)¶ The BwO refers to human, animal, textual, sociocultural and physical bodies. Rejecting a psychoanalytic conception of the body which is the 'developmental union or aggregate of partial objects, organs, drives, and bits, each with their own significance and their own pleasures, which are through oedipalization, brought into line with the body's organic unity' (Grosz, 1994: 201), instead the BwO is:¶ the body disinvested of all fantasies, images, and projections, a body without a physical interior, without internal cohesion or latent signifi cance . . . it is not a body evacuated of a psychic interiority, rather, it is a limit of a tendency to which all bodies aspire.¶ (p. 201, emphasis added)¶ Deleuze and Guattari remark that it can be considered as a surface of intensities in pure tension but before it is stratified, ordered, organized, divided, hierarchized and invested with demography. It isn't even autopoi- etic, as it lacks internal organization, or any depth of structure, has no under lying rationality, and follows no grammatical rules to give it structure and meaning. It is not just flow or intensity, but the arresting of such flow or intensity in particular ways, which then breaks down.¶ The BwO does not reject organs and is not opposed to them at all - rather it is opposed to the organism that is originated by the structure or organization of the body, resisting any equation with a notion of identity or property as 'the BwO is never yours or mine. It is always a body', which remains in radical materiality (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 164, emphasis in original; Grosz, 1994: 202). Yet paradoxically, at the same time the BwO is always deferred, always in Derrida's terms in differance, is always also a body to come, never fully present or sufficient in and of itself. It isn't a place, although it is like one; it isn't a plane, although it has some of its qualities; it isn't a scene, although it has the properties of a vista; it isn't a fantasy, although fantasy is part of it. It is a field where desire is produced in new conjunctions, intensified through new nodalities and modalities, where desire is immanent, where becomings become (Grosz, 1994). It is where, following Spinoza's account of the human animal, we set our bodily characteristics free to pursue new becomings - Deleuze and Guattari discuss becoming-woman and becoming-animal - of which the ultimate becoming is becoming imper ceptible, pure full process. Identity as imperceptibility.¶ In going beyond the limitations and constraints of the bipolar gender binary, we can bring our discussion of desire, rhizomatics and BwO together to suggest that if gender is a rhizome then the possibilities for gender fluidity at an ontological level are actual and real. Moreover, if gender is a produc tive process whose productivity is pure, that is, it rests in the creativity of effulgent desire rather than being defined and delimited by the product it creates (such as gender as a dramaturgical or linguistic performance [Benhabib, 1999; Butler, 1990, 1993], social construction or social practice [Gherardi, 1995]) then our view of gender identity even as conventional multiplicity needs revision. Gender fluidity is not merely movement across a binary boundary (which nevertheless leaves the boundary in place) or across several horizontal boundaries between multiple identities. Identity is motion, fluidity dissolves boundaries and carries them off in its flood.¶ If gender identity is considered in terms of this molecularity it can be seen as a site within the field of becomings that goes beyond bisexuality and multiple genders; beyond the traversing of gender which may be reversible or irreversible at a physical level and may involve temporary or permanent relocations across the binary divide; beyond the gender performance in both language and action which characterizes itself as gender transient. A truly nomadic gender identity transcends its roles and its transgressive realign ments of molar unities as a becoming. It may take several lines of flight: it may, for example, become genderful - so expansive and inclusive in its myriad gender alignments that it cannot be aligned or consigned within gender limits, as these limits now contain everything else, themselves a form of gendering; or it may become ungendered, where gender is dissipated, overlain by and completely absorbed into so many other alignments that it ceases to function as a category, but remains a minor dimension of all experi ence. In staying in motion, in change, in becoming other, it resists those inscriptions that fix and name it and thus allow it to be perceived as an identity - it becomes imperceptible. It is here that Deleuzian rhizomatics and Bornstein's gender fluidity achieve commensurability. This is underscored by our earlier affirmation of an ontology of desire as creative exuberance, which fits with Bornstein's (1994, 1998) ludic gender politics. The terrain for politi cal praxis, which Bornstein and Califia debate, is shifted, with this onto- logical intervention, from the traditional view of gender as property or the performative view of gender as a product of linguistic or social performance to gender as itself a form of productivity. Gender is not the construction or outcome of a performance but is immanent within those performances making them productive of new molecular connections in the meshwork of identity.

### Anthro

#### The 1ac starts from an anthropocentric starting point – applies universal environmental truths to only a single part of the environment – i.e. sexual difference can only aply to animals in reality the world is different

**Peacock ND** [“Sex Change in Nature” - Coral Reef Fish, Richard Peacock, Evolution FAQ]

For many species, it is certain that the majority of their offspring will not survive to adulthood. The solution, then, is to simply have more offspring. But this is where nature finds a limitation. While males of almost every species can produce sperm in very short order, the females, once impregnated, must wait until they give birth (or lay eggs) before they can reproduce again. For some fish common to coral reefs, evolution found an interesting solution. ¶ Change sex. ¶ Not only will the size, color, and markings of fish change as they change sexes, so too will their sexual organs and the gametes (sex cells) that they produce. ¶ Female-to-male (protogyny) fish which once produced eggs are able to instead produce sperm. This is conversely true for male-to-female fish (protandry). While some fish can only undergo a sex change once in their lives, others can go back and forth many times, or even have both sexual organs at once.

#### Visibility

**Booth 9** [“Some thoughts on visual perception”, by Alexis Booth, 9/30/09]

Though we might like to think that animals see the world with the same vivid colors and definition as human beings, perhaps just from different angles and perspectives, the truth is that vision differs greatly among animal species. ¶ Animals process visual information in distinct ways, largely a direct result of the specifics of their visual equipment. An animal's eyel and the arrangement of its various structures determine the basis of its visual world. Although all vertebrates utilize an eye that takes in images by focusing on an object in a camera-like manner, many have different eye shapes, and some do not possess all of the same structures (such as cones, which distinguish colors). Of course, some animals have receptors that pick up visual stimuli that humans cannot perceive; birds, for example, can see ultraviolet light, and as a result observe a variety of visual patterns which humans can only view through the use of additional external filters.

#### That masks the species war at the foundation of our society. Their control over the framing of what constitutes war enables all forms of coercion, mass extermination, and cultural annihilation.

**Kochi 9** [species war: law, violence, and animals, Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Sage Journals]

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. **The manner in which specific terms** (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) **are defined and their meanings** ordered **has** powerful and **bloody consequences for those who feel the force** and brunt **of these words** in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that **the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – species war**. That is, at **the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals**. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary **public debates** the “laws of war” are **typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions** and customs that **define the legality of a state’s right to go to war** under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: **what types of coercion, v violence and killing may be included** within the definition of “war,” **who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing**, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? **When we consider the relationship between war and law** in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at **the** **foundation of the Law of war resides species** **war.**

#### Impact is benocide – this species contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence towards life deemed politically unqualified.Kochi and Ordan 2008 [ Tarik ,Noam, Borderlands, Dec, 2008, An argument for the global suicide of humanity, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_6981/is\_3\_7/ai\_n31524968/?tag=content;col1]](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6981/is_3_7/ai_n31524968/?tag=content;col1%5d//JR)

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of 'evil', a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of 'evil' given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was 'evil', then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the 'human heritage', then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the 'West' generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane **acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history.** Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, **points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life** (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) **have been founded upon colonial violence**, war and the appropriation of other peoples' land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, **the history of colonialism highlights the** central function of **'race war' that often underlies human social organisation** and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that **events such as the Holocaust** are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, **lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity**. After all, all too often the **European colonisation** of the globe **was justified** by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially 'inferior' and in some instances that **they were closer to 'apes' than to humans** (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of 'race' is in many ways **merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans**. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human 'races') and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer's comment that whereas humans consider themselves "the crown of creation", for animals "all people are Nazis" and animal life is "an eternal Treblinka" (Singer, 1968, p.750). Certainly many organisms use 'force' to survive and thrive at the expense of their others. Humans are not special in this regard. However **humans,** due a particular form of self-awareness and ability to plan for the future, **have the capacity to carry out highly organised forms of violence and destruction** (i.e. the Holocaust; the massacre and enslavement of indigenous peoples by Europeans) and the capacity to develop forms of social organisation and communal life in which harm and violence are organised and regulated. It is perhaps this capacity for reflection upon the merits of harm and violence (the moral reflection upon the good and bad of violence) which gives humans a 'special' place within the food chain. Nonetheless, with these capacities come responsibility and our proposal of global suicide is directed at bringing into full view the issue of human moral responsibility. When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage--and the propagation of itself as a thing of value--has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps 'human' history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the future. **The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals** in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; **damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities**, individually and collectively.

### Sexual Healing

#### Even if the environment isn’t perfectly knowable, we should try to know what we can: rejecting visible knowledge privileges abstract theorizing which precludes effective environmental solutions

**De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” Avner p. 4-6, Questia.

However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians, history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others through deliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas. This explains why the shift from humanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid. Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faith in a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude, I believe, **only brings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom**. In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishing any of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge. Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the divergence between, say, ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend. In fact, as John Barry argues, 'reformed naturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well (J. Barry 1999 : ch. 3). But my point is that **saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission**. In a democratic system, however, one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to **how these policies should be explained to the public**, and thereby gain legitimacy. In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy. A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently, a policy's legitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and conviction it generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies in democratic regimes, there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists. Hence the first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premiss that environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away from anthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism. 9 My argument is that **the public on the whole is not ready for this**, and therefore many activists and potential supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on the environment. In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is that environmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophy requires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and the general public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. And yet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushed in this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggest that **environmental philosophers** should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these are important and fascinating questions. At least some of them **should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessary institutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuade others to act on behalf of the environment**. In other words, while there is a place for meta-ethics, it should not be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment; it should not replace political philosophy.

### Invisible Touch

#### Reject systematic or all-encompassing ‘root cause’ explanations for the human condition

**Bleiker ‘3** Roland, Professor of International Relations, University of Queensland “Discourse and Human Agency” Contemporary Political Theory. Avenel: Mar 2003.Vol. 2, Iss. 1;  pg. 25

**A conceptualization of human agency cannot be based on a parsimonious proposition, a one-sentence statement that captures something like an authentic nature of human agency. There is no essence to human agency, no core that can be brought down to a lowest common denominator, that will crystallize one day in a long sought after magic formula. A search for such an elusive centre would freeze a specific image of human agency to the detriment of all others.** The dangers of such a totalizing position have been well rehearsed. **Foucault (1982, 209), for instance, believes that a theory of power is unable to provide the basis for analytical work, for it assumes a prior objectification of the very power dynamics the theory is trying to assess. Bourdieu (1998, 25) speaks of the 'imperialism of the universal' and List (1993, 11) warns us of an approach that 'subsumes, or, rather, pretends to be able to subsume everything into one concept, one theory, one position.' Such a master discourse**, she claims, **inevitably oppresses everything that does not fit into its particular view of the world.** What, then, is the alternative to anchoring an understanding of human agency in a foundationalist master narrative? How to ground critique, actions, norms and life itself if there are no universal values that can enable such a process of grounding? Various authors have advanced convincing suggestions. Consider the following three examples: de Certeau (1990, 51) attempts to avoid totalitarian thought by grounding his position not in a systematic theory, but in 'operational schemes.' A theory is a method of delineation. It freezes what should be understood in its fluidity. An understanding of operational schemes, by contrast, recognizes that events should be assessed in their changing dimensions. Rather than trying to determine what an event is, such an approach maps the contours within which events are incessantly constituted and reconstituted. Or, expressed in de Certeau's terminology, one must comprehend forms of action in the context of their regulatory environment. Butler (1992, 3-7) speaks of contingent foundations. Like de Certeau, she too believes that the Foucaultean recognition that power pervades all aspects of society, including the position of the critic, does not necessarily lead into a nihilistic abyss. It merely shows that political closure occurs through attempts to establish foundational norms that lie beyond power. Likewise, to reopen this political domain is not to do away with foundations as such, but to acknowledge their contingent character, to illuminate what they authorize, exclude and foreclose. One must come to terms with how the subject and its agency are constituted and framed by specific regimes of power. However, this is not the end of human agency. Quite to the contrary. Butler (1992, 12-14) argues persuasively that 'the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency.' To appreciate the practical relevance of this claim, one must investigate the possibilities for agency that arise out of existing webs of power and discourse. One must scrutinize how social change can be brought about by a reworking of the power regimes that constitute our subjectivity (Butler, 1992, 13). **Deleuze and Guattari** (1996, 3-25, 377) go a step further. Opting for the rhizome, they **reject all forms of foundations, structures, roots or trees. The latter three, they say, has dominated much of the Western thought. A tree is a hierarchical system in which ones becomes two, in which everything can be traced back to the same origin. Roots and radicles may shatter the linear unity of knowledge, but they hold on to a contrived system of thought, to an image of the world in which the multiple always goes back to a centred and higher unity.** The brain, by contrast, is not rooted, does not strive for a central point. It functions like a subterranean rhizome. It grows sideways, has multiple entryways and exits. It has no beginning or end, only a middle, from where it expands and overspills. Any point of the rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, is connected to any other. It is a multiplicity without hierarchies, units or fix points to anchor thought. There are only lines, magnitudes, dimensions, plateaus, and they are always in motion. To travel along these lines and dimensions is to engage in nomad thought, to travel along axis of difference, rather than identity. Nomad thought, says one of Deleuze's feminist interpreters, 'combines coherence with mobility,' it is 'a creative sort of becoming, a performative metaphor that allows for otherwise unlikely encounters and unsuspected sources of interaction of experience and of knowledge' (Braidotti, 1994, 21). The extent to which this form of thinking constitutes a grounding process may be left open to question. Judging from Deleuze's own work it is clear, however, that **the exploration of difference and multiplicities does not prevent him from taking positions for or against specific political issues. What he does forgo, however, is a central authorial voice -- to the benefit of a polyphonic array of whispers and shouts.**

#### Even if sexual difference exists, those biological differences have no inherent meaning and can’t be said to be the root of war

**Guenther** asst prof phil @ vandy **2010** (Lisa “Other Fecundities: Proust and Irigaray on Sexual Difference” Differences: A journal of feminst cultural studies Volume 21, Number 2)

While critical of Irigaray’s recent efforts to construct a foundational role for sexual duality, the alternative account I have developed here nevertheless remains inspired by Irigaray’s work insofar as it affirms sexual difference as irreducible to the one or the same. In the Proustian model, male and female parts exist, but they have **no inherent content**, pattern, or tendency; what makes them meaningful, and what produces the effect of sexed tendencies or worlds, are patterns of circulation and exchange, specific practices of sexuality, and local histories of sexual encounters. Without the search for whatever rare and delicate pleasures we are capable of experiencing, the material sites of sexual duality **remain sterile and meaningless**. This is not to say that biological sex does not exist or does not count as “real,” but that it does not mean anything without the continuous but continually shifting patterns of exchange between bodies. The multiplicity of bodily drives, and the encounters with alterity that they engender, fertilize the meaning of sexual duality; and likewise, the duality of the sexes orients and stabilizes, without thereby restricting, the circulation of multiple drives. For Proust, there is nothing unnatural about a man becoming a woman to penetrate another man who has become a woman in a different but complementary way. It’s as natural as the birds and the bees!23 Far from betraying or disavowing sexual difference through their transformations, Charlus and Jupien are following its “higher law”: a law that seeks pleasure with others in difference and self-differing, but for whom this difference need not appear in one particular shape or another. The local specificity of such encounters is as rich and varied as the moral botanist could hope for, and the possibilities for their expression are limited only by our patience to discover them.

#### They don’t solve the aff – other forms of oppression are not linked to sexual difference – racial oppression for example is linked to percieved differences in skin colour – their inability to account for this prevents coalition building with other actors, means they don’t solve the K

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As Hesse-Biber, Gilmartin, and Lydenberg (1999) discussed, the issue of whether the gender binary itself should be destabilized ultimately polarized feminist theory. French feminists, such as Cixous (1986), Irigaray (1991), and Kristeva (1986), seemed to ‘‘establish the female body and maternity as foundational and symbolic sources of women’s psychic and sexual difference’’ (Hesse-Biber, Gilmartin, & Lydenberg, 1999, p. 4), that is, that an essentialist view of ‘‘femaleness’’ as being natural and different from ‘‘maleness’’ was necessary for understanding and empowering women. In contrast, poststructuralist critics, like Butler (1993), argued that the materiality of the body was ‘‘already gendered, already constructed’’ (p. xi), such that the supposed physical basis of the gender binary was a socially derived construction of reality. The degree and manner to which gender should be deconstructed continues to be both an issue among feminist theorists and a source of tension between feminist and queer theorists (Jagose, 2009). Scott (1986), for example, applied the postmodern perspective of individualism to argue for the social construction of gender and, therefore, that essentialism and the taken for granted role that ‘‘the sexed body is given’’ needs to be questioned. She stated that ‘‘gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and [that] gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power’’ (p. 1067). According to Shields (2008), one’s identity is not just about his or her own self-identification but is also about the intersecting larger social structures and the power differentials that are associated with belonging to a certain group or groups. Individuals may belong to multiple socially oppressed groups, experiencing not only the sexism addressed by feminism but also the racism, classism, homophobia, and so forth. These intersections generate both oppression and opportunity (Zinn & Dill, 1996) including opportunities for coalition building to oppose multiple oppressions. As Risman (2004, p. 442) noted, ‘‘one must always take into consideration multiple axes of oppression; to do otherwise presumes the whiteness of women, the maleness of people of color, and the heterosexuality of everyone.’’ A feminist theory that adheres to an essentialist, fixed binary conception of gender identity is inadequate in addressing intersectional issues and fails to account for how a supposedly autonomous self in such a system can be empowered to resist oppression (see also, critique of liberal-individualist models of Shotwell and Sangrey, 2009). Bettcher (2010) noted that Haraway (1991) questioned the universality of the experience of oppression among women and Anzaldu´a (1987) proposed that it is the consciousness of the plurality of selves, which are associated with multiple social identities that allows for resistance to oppression. For transgenders, at least two identities, those of gender and of sexuality, are always intersectional, although, as we discuss later, feminist and queer theorists have at times tried deliberately to keep these identities separate.

#### Patriarchy doesn’t explain environmental destruction

**Benton and Short, 99** (Lisa, Visiting Assistant professor of Geography at Colgate University, John, professor of geography at Syracuse University, Environmental Discourse and Practice, Pg. 144-145)

Any narrow feminist analysis that only briefly discusses economics and the environment oversimplifies economic structures and situates them merely as tools of the patriarchy. For example, even Seager (who rejects ecofeminism) stated, "it is clear that industry-generated environmental destruction is seldom, if ever, an inevitability |of capitalism] it is not a necessary side effect of industrial progress."40 We would argue that environmental destruction is most certainly a side effect of an economic system operating in combination with an environmental metadiscourse that seeks control over nature. For example, in China, it has been the pursuit of economic development that has accelerated environmental exploitation, despite both a reverence for nature and a cultural history with a distinctly different gender relationship.41 Many ecoferninist and feminist perspectives struggling to articulate a new environmental discourse unsatisfactorily address class, ethnicity, and age - not as independent agencies/structures but as "subcontractors" of patriarchy. Thus although many ecofeminists would agree that governments and industry arc often composed of people from the wealthy elite, few offer little discussion of class as distinct from patriarchy. We would agree that there is a behavioral dimension of morality and socialization, but we find the cursory examination of economic institutions and/or class as a signal that many feminists and ecofeminists are reluctant to explore anything other than patriarchy as the sole cause for environmental destruction. We believe that feminist arguments relying on a single agency (patriarchy) as the lynchpin in the whole system of environmental degradation are problematic. We would counter that human attempts to control nature can be traced back to such technological inventions as fire, the wheel, tools - all of which predate patriarchal societies. Patriarchy is not the original explanation of environmental change and degradation; rather we would agree with the deep ecologists that the anthropocentric view rests at the heart of environmental exploitation. In relying on "gender" as the primary factor, ecofeminists actually construct a new meta-narrative in the same tradition as modernists or Marxists. For example, it is highly probable that a rich/white/female/elite member, driving a convertible sports car does not have the same concern for or affinity to nature as a poor/ Latina/female/single mother who labors in the strawberry fields in the Central Valley of California. Feminists who see patriarchy as the structure responsible for creating environmental degradation dangerously assume that the domination of women and nature is a cross-cultural phenomenon. Woman-as-victim becomes the dominant concept, overlooking the fact that women have collaborated in their own subordination and in the oppression of other women. We must assign women some culpability: after all some women continue to purchase toxic household cleaners, they adorn themselves in fur, they choose to drive gas-guzzling cars (such as sports utility vehicles) and enjoy jet-setting across the globe, thus contributing to the release of tons of carbon dioxide.

#### Gendered binaries don’t organize the world

**Hooper 1** Charlotte (University of Bristol research associate in politics), *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics* pp 45-46.

Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993), in their discussion of gendered dichotomies, appear to drop Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse as an explanation for gendered dichotomies in favor of a more straightforward- ly political account.14Gendered dichotomies, rather than uniformly con- structing gendered social relations through universal psychoanalytic mecha- nisms, are seen more ambiguously, as playing a dual role. Where gendered dichotomies are used as an organizing principle of social life (such as in the gendered division of labor) they help to construct gender differences and in- equalities and thus are constitutive of social reality, but in positing a grid of polar opposites, they also serve to obscure more complex relationships, commonalties, overlaps, and intermediate positions (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 24–25). Elaborating on this view, it can be argued that gendered dichotomies are in part ideological tools that mystify, masking more complex social realities and reinforcing stereotypes. On one level, they do help to produce real gen- der differences and inequalities, when they are used as organizing principles that have practical effects commensurate with the extent that they become embedded in institutional practices, and through these, human bodies. They constitute one dimension in the triangular nexus out of which gender identities and the gender order are produced. But at the same time, institutional practices are not always completely or unambiguously informed by such dichotomies, which may then **operate to obscure more complex relationships**. It is a mistake to see the language of gendered dichotomies as a uniﬁed and totalizing discourse that dictates every aspect of social practice to the extent that we are coherently produced as subjects in its dualistic image. As well as the disruptions and discontinuities engendered by the intersections and interjections of other discourses (race, class, sexuality, and so on) **there is always room for evasion, reversal, resistance, and dissonance** between rhetoric, practice, and embodiment, as well as reproduction of the symbolic order, as identities are negotiated in relation to all three dimensions, in a variety of **complex and changing circumstances**. On the other hand, the symbolic gender order does inform practice, and our subjectivities are produced in relation to it, so to dismiss it as performing only an ideological or propagandistic role is also too simplistic.

#### Their impact evidence is based on Lacan

**Hollander (1AC author) in 9** (Nancy; When Not Knowing Allies with Destructiveness: Global Warning and Psychoanalytic Ethical Non-neutrality; International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies Vol 6 No 1; Scholar)

I want to fi rst situate my psychoanalytic understanding of how our embeddedness in culture makes it very diffi cult to develop a critical consciousness that would permit us to heed the global warnings of ecological destruction manifested in climate change and global warming, the daily loss of ecosystems, the greenhouse effects, the appearance of new pathogenic diseases and the re-emergence of once-conquered pandemic diseases. As French psychoanalyst Jacques **Lacan has argued, the unconscious is constituted by an alterity created by the “discourse of the Other” (Lacan, 1988, p. 85). For Lacan, splitting is the fundamental developmental process through which the subject is created by the intersubjective relationships that contextualize it, predate it and extend beyond it**. Because the subject’s culturally-induced sense of selfhood originates from external forces (language, patriarchy, unconscious expectations of others, etc.), a misrecognition and self-misrepresentation is the inevitable outcome. The socio-symbolic order confers an identity that comes from outside, forcing the subject to experience loss and rupture through the enforced recognition of difference and prohibition. **Lacan’s perspective emphasizes the inevitability of divisions within the self and among subjects even as desire for unifi cation is asserted.** The subject’s actual state of diffuseness or decentered-ness is partially transcended through the social order**, which provides a consolingly coherent identity through the dominant ideology based on attributes such as** class, race and **gender** (Lacan, 1988).

#### The application of Lacanian psychoanalysis to language creates a circularity where the analysis proves the theory and the theory becomes true in virtue of the analysis. This is sloppy scholarship -- analysts are able to simply make up their conclusions without regard to any sort of testable hypothesis or proof outside of interpretation. Reject their epistemic claims

**O’Neill '1** (Edward, prof soc @ UC San Francisco “The Last Analysis of Slavoj Zizek” <http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol5-2001/n17oneill>

It would be hasty to assume that the ideas propounded by authors who class themselves as partisans of a Lacanian school are without value, even if one concludes that the rhetorical strategies employed to propound them are suspect, just as it would be naive to search for a theory 'without rhetoric' -- as if that could be subtracted off like so much butterfat. But when so many of the 'examples' given to explicate and to justify the theory are borrowed from other sources, it is possible to wonder whether the ideas being presented necessitate a reference to Lacan without which the ideas would no longer be 'Lacanian'. The reader begins to suspect that Lacan is being explicated through interpretations arrived at without the aid of Lacan's theories, which in turn causes one to wonder about the value of the theories being proffered. One gets the distinct impression that the writers collected in this volume, chief among them its editor, borrow the interpretations of others and then refine them and re-christen them as 'Lacanian', all the while claiming to set themselves apart from their academic rivals. But the difference seems in so many cases mostly nominal. Doubtless that is a 'performative' effect, and thus in itself Lacanian, since J. L. Austin's performative is probably itself already Lacanian. Despite consistent appeals to a the speech act model in Lacanian writing, the gesture of appealing to authority relies on an authority the gesture cannot itself confer but rather must depend upon, and so the very pronouncement of specific statements in this case does not produce the effects the statements describe, however much the authors might wish it were so. Being for or against a certain author or school should in principle be distinguishable from the ability to analyze the arguments presented, the terms into which they are cast, and their method of argumentation. I do not think the standards I have suggested above are so terribly constraining that they discourage serious discussion. Nor do I think the theories currently presented by means which are suspect are therefore themselves to be discarded. But to judge the ideas at issue would require better arguments being made, and by better means too. The arguments presented in this volume do not take many steps in that direction. To return at last to the question of method in the humanities under the banner of which I began this review, I am trying to say that it is not the conclusions which determine the validity of the theory but rather the procedures, since the conclusions in the human sciences tend to be simply the theoretical premises re-stated as if they were conclusions. If procedures without apparent method or rationale are used to reach a conclusion which as been determined in advance, we tend to feel the 'procedures' are a tissue of rationalizations.

Such is often the case with the argumentative writing in the current volume. A more difficult exercise would be to disentangle, to the extent possible, the exact place of Lacan as a reader of Kant and Hegel, rather than collapsing Kant and Hegel into prefigurations of Lacan. The fact that this latter strategy is closer to what patient readers of Lacan like Mikkel Borch-Jacobson and Samuel Weber have done is proof that Lacan \*does\* have something significant to say, or in any case that he can be read as part of a tradition, as a reader of other texts. But assuming in advance that what Lacan said is both true and universally applicable is an entirely different project from either \*determining\* exactly what Lacan said or \*applying\* it, either of which would require a method. Assuming Lacan was correct may be a condition for being a Lacanian, but as a rhetorical strategy for convincing others that Lacan is a writer to be read, the strategy leaves much to be desired, since it assumes what it might instead set out to demonstrate, and demonstration is in the end a far more effective rhetorical tack than assumption.

## 2nc framework

### Overview/Lasch

#### K2 destabilize pedagogical SQ (part of aff evidence referenced)

**Peers in 12** (Chris; Faculty of Education of Monash University; “Freud, Plato and Irigaray: A morpho-logic of teaching and learning”; *Educational Philosophy and Theory,Vol. 44, No. 7*; Ebsco Host)\

**A pupil who won’t listen is a hole in the ‘completeness’ of the teaching and learning game, a blind spot, an ‘invisible’ that won’t reflect back the teacher’s wholeness as it is consecrated in his (or her) speech i.e. this pupil is refractory, resisting or distorting the image that the teacher anticipates.** (It follows, of course, that the teacher who won’t listen similarly destabilizes pedagogical logic.)

#### Our ground disad means their convictions are presumptively false because they aren’t amenable to direct contestation

**Lasch 95** (Christopher, Social Critic and Author, “The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy”, p. 170-171)

THE ROLE OF the press, as Lippmann saw it, was to circulate information, not to encourage argument. The relationship between information and argument was antagonistic, not complementary. He did not take the position that reliable information was a necessary precondition of argument; on the contrary, his point was that information precluded argument, made argument unnecessary. Arguments were what took place in the absence of reliable information. Lippmann had forgotten what he learned (or should have learned) from William James and John Dewey: that our search for reliable information is itself guided by the questions that arise during arguments about a given course of action. It is only by subjecting our preferences and projects to the test of debate that we come to understand what we know and what we still need to learn. Until we have to defend our opinions in public, they remain opinions in Lippmann's pejorative sense—half-formed convictions based on random impressions and unexamined assumptions. It is the act of articulating and defending our views that lifts them out of the category of "opinions," gives them shape and definition, and makes it possible for others to recognize them as a description of their own experience as well. In short, we come to know our own minds only by explaining ourselves to others. The attempt to bring others around to our own point of view carries the risk, of course, that we may adopt their point of view instead. We have to enter imaginatively into our opponents' arguments, if only for the purpose of refuting them, and we may end up being persuaded by those we sought to persuade. Argument is risky and unpredictable, therefore educational. Most of us tend to think of it (as Lippmann thought of it) as a clash of rival dogmas, a shouting match in which neither side gives any ground. But arguments are not won by shouting down opponents. They are won by changing opponents' minds—something that can happen only if we give opposing arguments a respectful hearing and still persuade their advocates that there is something wrong with those arguments. In the course of this activity we may well decide that there is something wrong with our own.

### A2 deactivated politics

#### A deliberative model with predictable limits accesses case—we don’t have to be policymakers to be self-reflexive and socially empowered

**Dryzek 2008** – Head of the Social and Political Theory Programme at the Australian National University (7/16, John, University of Bern, “Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building”, www.bids.unibe.ch/unibe/rechtswissenschaft/oefre/bids/content/e3409/e3822/e3824/linkliste3831/Dryzek.pdf)

Communications are deliberative to the degree they can induce reflection about the preferences that individuals hold, are non-coercive, and able to relate the particular interests of individuals and groups to more universal principles (Dryzek, 2000, p. 68). Gutmann and Thompson (1996) define the key deliberative virtue as reciprocity, making arguments in terms others can accept. Bearing in mind communication other than argument, this virtue can be stated as communicating in terms others can accept. So for example rhetoric can be used to inflame the passions of one’s own religious, ethnic, or national group, and so merit condemnation. But in a context where there are other identities, religions, ethnicities, or nationalities, a speaker’s rhetoric can try to appeal to the symbols valued by these other groups in order to induce reflection on their part. Political systems are deliberatively undemocratic to the extent they minimize opportunities for individuals to reflect freely upon their political preferences. Autocracies may be interested in individuals’ preferences, but only to convince people to accept the regime’s doctrine, backed by a threat of coercion. If demagogues appeal to ethnic nationalist values then the criterion of connection to more universal principles is violated. Authoritarians might appeal to general principles: so for example the Soviet leadership would justify its actions in terms of Marxist principles generalizable to humanity. However, that kind of justification cannot reach those who do not share a well-defined ideological framework, thus violating reciprocity. The same might be said of those invoking economic efficiency as a non-negotiable principle for marketizing government. Applying deliberative principles to evaluate particular instances of communication in democratic terms does not automatically translate to a concept that is useful in analyzing and evaluating whole regimes or political systems. For that we need an account of deliberative capacity.

Deliberative capacity may be defined as the extent to which a political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is authentic, inclusive, and consequential. Pursuit of this capacity does not connote any particular institutional prescription (be it competitive elections, a constitution, or a set of forums), but may be secured in connection with different sorts of institutions and practices. Authenticity can be understood in light of the tests just introduced (deliberation must induce reflection in noncoercive fashion, connect particular claims to more general principles, and exhibit reciprocity). Inclusiveness applies to the range of interests and discourses present in a political setting. Without inclusiveness, there may be deliberation, but not deliberative democracy. (Mutz, 2006 worries that deliberation works against inclusion because ‘hearing the other side’ induces people to participate less. But Mutz is referring only to unstructured talk in everyday life, not deliberation, still less deliberation tied to particular locations in a political system.) ‘Consequential’ means that deliberative processes must have an impact upon collective decisions, or social outcomes. This impact need not be direct – **deliberation need not involve the actual making of policy** decisions. For example, public deliberation might have an influence on decision makers who are not themselves participants in deliberation. This might occur when an informal deliberative forum makes recommendations that are subsequently taken into account by policy makers. Nor need the outcomes in question be explicit policy decisions; they might (for example) be informal products of a network, entailing ‘governance without government.’ A polity with a high degree of authentic, inclusive, and consequential deliberation will have an effective deliberative system. Before describing the conceptually necessary features of such a system, I will enumerate some political sites that might feed in to it.

Where Can Deliberation be Found?

We can begin with the central institutions of states, such as legislatures, cabinets, corporatist councils that empower representatives of labor and business federations as well as government executives, and constitutional courts. (Rawls, 1993, p. 231 believes the US Supreme Court is an exemplary deliberative institution.) Designed forums such as citizens’ juries, citizens’ assemblies, deliberative polls, consensus conferences, and stakeholder dialogues can also contribute – and these have appeared in developing countries, so are not just an attribute of developed liberal democracies. For example, a widely praised and occasionally copied deliberative approach to participatory civic budgeting has been developed in Brazil, notably in Porto Alegre (Fung, 2003, pp. 360-2). Benhabib (1996) and Habermas (1996) stress the informal public sphere, where deliberation generates public opinion which then ought to influence deliberation in the legislature. The public sphere may play an especially important role in countries where formal legislative deliberation is weak or absent. For example, Poland in the early 1980s featured no legislature with any deliberative capacity. But Poland did have a flourishing public sphere associated with the Solidarity movement in which deliberation was practiced and deliberative capacity built. Ekiert and Kubik (1999) argue that even after 1989, the public sphere in Poland was a kind of remedial site that compensated for deliberative failure in state institutions. But the public sphere in any democracy is where perspectives and ideas are generated, policy decisions are questioned, and citizen competences are developed.

Different sites can contribute to deliberative capacity in different proportions in different societies and systems. We should not fixate on any one particular institutional contributor to this mix and assume it is the key to deliberative capacity. For example, we might dismiss contemporary China as thoroughly lacking in deliberative capacity if we focused on central state institutions and the public sphere, severely circumscribed by controls over the media and restrictions on association, advocacy, and expression. If China does have any deliberative capacity, it might be found in participatory innovations at the local level, designed in part to cope with the unwanted side-effects of rapid economic growth. Those interested in the democratization of China could look for ways of building up from this localized capacity. Some members of the Communist Party leadership have seemed receptive to such possibilities. Li Junru, Vice President of the Central Party School, in 2005 called for the expansion of deliberative democracy in China (He & Leib, 2006, p. 8). Skeptics can point to particular local assemblies that 6 remain controlled by party officials. But cases do exist where forums have overruled the decisions of party officials. Deliberative democratization need not be top-down reform of central state institutions.

Deliberative capacity can also be sought in non-traditional institutional forms such as governance networks (Sørensen & Torfing, 2006). Networks transcend formal political institutions, and sometimes cross state boundaries. They can be made up of a variety of public and private actors. Sometimes they are purely informal, sometimes their role is validated by governments or inter-governmental organizations. Sometimes they have little deliberative capacity. So global financial networks as described by Castells (1996) work on the basis of unreflective shared commitment to market-oriented neoliberalism. However, the webs of transnational regulation described by Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) involve NGOs, businesses, activists, publicists, and government officials in relationships that need to develop deliberative capacity, because interactions begin with competing understandings and values that need to be bridged in order to craft effective regulation in the absence of sovereign authority. When networks transcend state boundaries they may still contribute to the deliberative capacity of states. For example, the fact that the transnational network monitoring social and ecological certification of forest products actively engages timber producers and government officials in timber exporters such as Indonesia through the Forest Stewardship Council scheme may contribute to the deliberative capacity of Indonesia.

On one account, governance networks are increasingly displacing the sovereign state in the production of collective outcomes. Internally, the state is ‘hollowed out’ (Rhodes, 1994). Externally, transnational networks overshadow the decisive policy actions of states. It is not necessary to take a position on these controversial propositions here. It should simply be noted that a conceptualization of democratization as deliberative capacity can be applied to governance networks – whereas electoral approaches to democratization cannot. Networks do not hold elections, nor do they have constitutions.

The Deliberative System

Analysis of democratization in terms of deliberative capacity building requires a way to account for the degree of completeness of a deliberative system, which for Mansbridge (1999) reaches from ‘everyday talk’ to representative legislatures. This notion is extended by Hendriks (2006), who shows how informal public spheres can be linked to deliberation in more formal governmental settings, with a crucial role for designed forums populated by a mix of public and private actors. Parkinson (2006, pp.166-73) shows how different actors and institutions (activists, experts, bureaucracy, designed forums, media, legislature, and referenda or petitions) can combine to generate deliberative legitimation in public policy. In this system, different kinds of communication might be appropriate in different places: Parkinson thinks that rhetoric has a place in agenda-setting by activists, but not elsewhere (p. 172). Constitutional courts (which could easily be added to Parkinson’s scheme) may feature skillful application of argument in public interest terms to legal and policy issues – but rarely do justices (at least on the US Supreme Court) actually talk to each other, still less subject themselves to public accountability. This sort of scheme can accommodate the paradox that effective deliberation sometimes benefits from moments of secrecy, allowing representatives to try to understand each other without immediately being pulled back by 7 skeptical constituents (Chambers, 2004). Publicity can enter later, or elsewhere in the deliberative system.

The specific deliberative systems sketched by Mansbridge, Hendriks, and Parkinson are too tied to the institutional details of developed liberal democracies to be applicable in the comparative study of democratization. For we can imagine deliberative systems without (say) a legislature, or internally deliberative political parties, or designed forums, or elections. A more general scheme for a deliberative system would be composed of the following elements:

1. Public Space. A deliberative space (or spaces) with few restrictions on who can participate, and few legal restrictions on what they can say, thus featuring a diversity of viewpoints. Such spaces may be found in connection with the media, social movements, activist associations, physical locations where people can gather and talk (cafés, classrooms, bars, public squares), the internet, public hearings, and designed citizen forums of various sorts (which restrict on the basis of numbers, but not on the kinds of persons who can deliberate).

2. Empowered space. A deliberative space for actors recognizably part of institutions producing collective decisions. Such a space might be home to or constituted by a legislature, a corporatist council, sectoral committees in a corporatist system, a cabinet, a constitutional court, or an empowered stakeholder dialogue. The institution itself need not be formally empowered; so a network producing collective outcomes would also constitute one such space. Public space and empowered space can both be tested for the degree to which they are inclusive of relevant interests and voices.

3. Transmission. Some means by which public space can influence empowered space. These means might involve political campaigns, or the deployment of rhetoric, or the making of arguments, or cultural change effected by social movements that come to pervade the understandings of formally empower actors, or personal links between actors in the two kinds of spaces. The relationship between public space and empowered space can be critical, or it can be supportive, or it might be both.

4. Accountability. Some means whereby empowered space is accountable to public space. Such accountability is key to the generation of broad deliberative legitimacy for collective outcomes. The specific elements mentioned under (2) might also act as accountability mechanisms, as might election campaigns where empowered politicians have to justify positions taken to a broader public.

5. Decisiveness. Some means whereby these first four elements are consequential in influencing the content of collective decisions. It is possible, for example, that a parliament may be a flourishing deliberative chamber under (2) – but have no impact on the decisions of a president who rules by decree (such as Boris Yeltsin in Russia in the 1990s). Or a government may look internally deliberative – but have its key policy decisions dictated by international financial institutions.

The kinds of communication present in elements 1-4 can be more or less deliberative according to the ‘authenticity’ criteria introduced earlier. An empirical measure of deliberative authenticity has been developed by Steiner et al (2004), in the form of a discourse quality index. Applying this index involves parsing the transcript of a debate and coding each intervention in the debate on multiple criteria. The scores for each contribution are summed and averaged to give a measure of the quality of the debate as a whole. Steiner et al then compare similar types of debates in similar institutions in different countries, finding that parliamentary discourse quality is facilitated by presidential, consensual, and bicameral features of state institutions. To date Steiner et al have compared only developed liberal democracies, but it would be a straightforward matter to extend their analysis to other systems in a research program on the institutional determinants of deliberative authenticity. However, a system featuring quality legislative deliberation may conceivably have poor deliberation when it comes to other parts of empowered space, or public space. Ideally we would want to apply a discourse quality index to communication in all these locations.

The deliberative system as a whole is diminished by any non-deliberative substitute for any element. For example, transmission might be secured by those in empowered space fearing the political instability that those in public space might unleash if they are ignored. This means might be the only one available for local deliberations in China to have a cumulative impact on (currently non-deliberative) empowered space in modifying China’s developmental path (He & Warren, 2008). Or accountability might be sought in a plebiscite with no opposition allowed to campaign.

While I have given examples, no particular institution is required by any of the elements of a deliberative system. There are potentially many kinds of deliberative systems; and the kind we see in (say) a transnational network will not resemble what we see in an adversarial Anglo-American liberal democracy, which will not resemble what we see in the European Union, which will not resemble what we see in a more consensual Confucian state.

Particular deliberative systems may have peculiar or unique features. In transnational regulatory networks, empowered space may be coterminous with public space, as the content of (say) forest certification regulation is negotiated in dialogue encompassing NGOs, timber corporations, certifiers, government officials, and consumer representatives. This particular deliberative system falls short on decisiveness given the extent of timber production not regulated by the network. In the European Union, the open method of coordination linking the European Commission and the policy decisions of member states is a unique deliberative form in empowered space that is decisive in producing collective outcomes (Eriksen, Joerges, & Neyer, 2003). In EU institutions more generally, the norm is that member state representatives have to argue in terms of shared legal principles and/or common interest justifications. The EU falls short on public space, given the lack of a European public sphere, with NGOs, parties, and the media all organized on a national basis. Accountability is weak, as European elections are fought by national parties on national issues, and no accountability mechanism effectively substitutes for elections.

A system with high deliberative capacity will feature authentic deliberation in elements 1-4, will be inclusive in elements 1-2, and will also be decisive. Real-world political systems will fall short to greater or lesser degree; and may conceivably be missing one or more elements entirely. These five logical requirements constitute a starting point for the description and evaluation of all real world deliberative systems, and their comparison across space and time. It is in this sense that deliberative capacity building provides the basis for a comprehensive approach to the study of democratization.

Democratization requires the development of all five elements, but it does not necessitate any specific institutions, be they competitive elections or a constitutional separation of powers. Thus some of the problems democracy promotion has when it is tied to a particular liberal electoral blueprint can be avoided. As Carothers (2002) points out, democracy promoters are often perplexed when specific elements of the blueprint (such as truly competitive elections) seem unattainable; thinking in terms of deliberative capacity would give them more options.

Institutions can constitute, and interact within, a deliberative system in intricate and variable ways. Seemingly low deliberative quality in one location (say, corporatist state institutions) may be compensated by, or even inspire, higher deliberative quality in another location (say, a flourishing public sphere). Conversely, high deliberative quality in one location may undermine deliberative quality in another location. For example, if legislators know that their more dubious collective decisions will be overruled by a constitutional court, they are free to engage in irresponsible rhetoric. Thus we should always keep our eye on whole systems. Quantitative measures of deliberative authenticity can inform comparison but cannot tell the whole story. Histories of the development (or attenuation) of deliberative capacity with time can be investigated, and comparative case study may be especially useful in locating the aspects of capacity present in one society but not in another.

In tracking deliberative capacity over time, we can evaluate continuous and long drawn out processes of democratization, such as that which unfolded over several centuries in the UK. But the deliberative approach can also be applied to the kinds of cases that now preoccupy democratization scholars, involving a disruptive transition in which an authoritarian regime gives way to a more democratic one. The concepts of transition and consolidation have been problematized by democratization scholars (Carothers, 2002; Schedler, 1998). Many hybrid regimes, including successors to clearly authoritarian regimes, fall far short of liberal democratic ideals, and show few signs of moving closer with time. It is possible to assess and explain the democratic fortunes of these and other sorts of regimes using the notion of deliberative capacity without mentioning either transition or consolidation. However, these two concepts remain important touchstones, and so I will organize the discussion in the next two sections through reference to them.

Deliberation in Transition

Breakdown of an authoritarian regime is more likely to yield a democratic replacement when there is deliberative capacity present under the old regime, because that capacity affects the background and capabilities that key actors bring to the political crisis. If opponents of the old regime come from a deliberative public space as opposed to (for example) a militarized resistance movement or a network of exiles involved in strategic machinations, then they can bring to the crisis some clear democratic commitments that stem from abiding by deliberative precepts. This was the sense in which civil society was idealized in pre-1989 East Central Europe. Democratic credentials are not easily established or developed in electoral or constitutional terms, because authoritarian regimes by definition lack free and fair elections under a constitution. Leaders with a background in deliberative public space are more likely to see transition in terms of establishing a democracy – rather than putting themselves in power. The public space in question need not involve large numbers of people, as the 1989 experience of Czechoslovakia shows. Deliberative participation in oppositional civil society comes with a self-limiting obligation that may be carried into the transitional crisis. This may also explain why figures with this background often subsequently prove no match for strategic power-seeking politicians more ruthless in seeking electoral advantage and building coalitions.

Deliberative capacity under authoritarian regimes may be found most straightforwardly in oppositional public spheres. But it is conceivable the old regime itself may develop some such capacity; in which case those schooled in it may be more likely to talk to rather than repress opponents as crisis looms. Deliberative capacity may also develop within society **at a distance from state power**, not clearly oppositional but not part of the administrative structure. While participants in such processes are unlikely to play a part in peak political events in the transitional crisis, they may be more likely to support a new democratic regime. He and Warren (2008) have this hope for China. Deliberation may also be found in the crisis itself. At the peak level, this can come in negotiations between old regime leaders and their opponents. It is possible to analyze such talks in purely strategic terms, as positional bargaining in which authoritarian leaders give up power in return for guarantees about their status in the new order. However, as Elster (1998, p. 105) points out, roundtable talks in Poland and (especially) Hungary in 1989 involved deliberation as well as bargaining. Participants made warnings about what might happen (that had to be explained and justified), not threats about what they could do to the other side; and argued in terms of the public interest. While the latter could be seen as hypocrisy on the part of old regime participants, as Elster argues, if public interest justifications were transparently dishonest, they would persuade nobody and there would be no point in making them. One indicator of dishonesty is perfect correspondence between one’s own interest and the alleged public interest, so this mode of arguing forces participants to shift away from pure self-interest. Threats and self-interested argument would, on Elster’s account, have risked breakdown of the talks.

More widespread public deliberation may enter the crisis, as with ‘people power’ in the Philippines in 1986, the ‘autumn of the people’ in 1989 East Central Europe, or the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004/5). To the extent that participants in such movements abide by deliberative precepts of non-coercive communication that induces reflection and connects particular demands to more general principles, they are a moral force for democracy – rather than a mob seeking revenge against oppressors. And this force is felt by elite negotiators.

Deliberation in Consolidation

Democratic consolidation is a concept with multiple meanings. Schedler (1998) argues we should restrict the concept to regime survival, entailing only avoidance of breakdown and erosion of democracy. He thinks we should not apply it to the building of democracy. For ‘the concepts of “democratic quality” and “democratic deepening” are still unclear and controversial’, such that conceptualizing consolidation as deepening ‘amounts to a free-for-all’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 104). However, at the core of the idea of deliberation is a developed notion of democratic quality, such that the greater the deliberative capacity of a system, the higher the quality of its democracy. The deliberative effects enumerated below can contribute to regime survival. But in potentially making regimes more legitimate, more effective in coping with divisions and solving social problems, better able to solve the basic problems of social choice, and more reflexive in correcting their own deficiencies, they increase democratic quality.

Legitimacy

Any new regime is faced with the challenge of securing legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Legitimacy can be achieved in many different ways, not all of them democratic. But in a democracy, reflective acceptance of collective decisions by actors who have had a chance to participate in consequential deliberation is an especially secure basis. This claim is at the heart of deliberative theory, which began as an account of legitimacy. Empirical study has lagged behind, but Parkinson (2006) shows how deliberative legitimacy can be generated by a combination of multiple forums and practices in a deliberative system for health policy making. Deliberative legitimacy can either substitute for or supplement other sources of legitimacy (such as consistency of a process with constitutional rules or traditional practices).

Coping with Deep Division.

Democratization in many societies is challenged by deep division on ethnic, racial, national, religious, or linguistic lines. While a number of solutions have been proposed to this problem, notably consociational power sharing (Lijphart 1977), deliberation too can play a part in healing division. Quite where this might be accomplished is an open question. O’Flynn (2006) seeks more deliberation linked to consociational institutions themselves. Dryzek (2005) stresses interactive forums composed of individuals from different blocks at a distance from contests about the construction of sovereign authority, concerned more with particular needs and concrete problems. Examples include mixedrace discussion groups in post-apartheid South Africa, and District Policing Partnerships in Northern Ireland. A large literature in conflict resolution emphasizes the effectiveness of deliberation among key parties to a dispute in producing durable solutions to conflicts, especially in mediation and through ‘consensus-building’ exercises (Susskind, McKearnan, & Thomas-Larmer, 1999). These exercises yield not consensus interpreted as universal agreement on a course of action and the reasons for it, but rather an agreement to which all sides can reflectively assent – if for different reasons (including fear of what might otherwise happen). In this light, agonistic **critics** of deliberation across identity difference such as Mouffe (1999) **who allege a deadening emphasis on consensus** miss the point (as well as providing no alternative way to reach collective decisions in the more passionate encounters of agonism).

Deliberation can have a social learning aspect that helps determine how different segments live together, without necessarily being validated in explicit policy decisions. Kanra (2005) shows that in Turkey, there are in fact substantial possibilities for deliberative learning across Islamists and secular left-liberals that cannot easily be expressed in public policy because of the way polarization between military-nationalist Kemalists and Islamists has been entrenched in electoral politics. Such social learning could nevertheless have consequences for political reconfiguration and social peace. Deliberation’s particular contribution to conflict resolution comes with mutual recognition of the legitimacy of disputed values and identities (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006, pp. 639-40). The absence of such recognition means politics becomes not a contest in which some losses and compromises are acceptable, but a fight to eradicate the values of the other side. This absence defines for example religious fundamentalisms that cannot tolerate in their societies what they see as sinful behavior or heresy. Neither side in such a contest can accept the possibility of even temporary defeat; and collective outcomes will lack legitimacy in the eyes of whichever side they disadvantage. Functioning democracies, in contrast, feature substantial normative meta-consensus on the legitimacy of disputed values. Meta-consensus has force in structuring political interaction across division to the degree it is reflectively accepted by key political actors; for that, deliberation is needed.

Tractability in Collective Choice

Deliberation offers one way – perhaps **the most effective** democratic way - to dispel the problems of instability and arbitrariness that some social choice theorists believe ought to plague democracies, as clever politicians wreak havoc in their strategic games by introducing new options and new dimensions of choice. Such problems may be especially acute in new democracies **with unclear rules and** contested **procedural understandings**. Riker (1982) suggests that this is in fact the normal condition of democratic politics – and not just in new democracies. So, for example, he blames the outbreak of the US Civil War on the machinations of elected politicians taking advantage of opportunities to manipulate agendas and votes. Van Mill (1996) argues that the **conditions of free deliberation are** exactly those **likely to exacerbate the problems** Riker identifies. The puzzle then becomes why we observe so little chaos in established liberal democracies (Mackie, 2003). One answer is that mature democracies have developed mechanisms endogenous to deliberation that can structure interaction and so overcome the dire predictions of Riker’s theory (Dryzek & List, 2003). Deliberation can produce agreement on a single dimension on which preferences are arrayed, thus ruling out the introduction of other dimensions to confound collective choice on the part of clever strategists (Miller, 1992). It can also produce agreement on the range of alternatives considered acceptable. As Arrow’s (1963) theorem implies, if democratic processes cannot find a way to induce such agreements, the main available alternative is dictatorship. To the extent new democracies develop deliberative capacity, they can cope with the dangers identified by social choice theory: arbitrariness, instability, civil conflict, and a lapse into dictatorship. Voting in both elections and in the legislature can then proceed without fear.

Effectiveness in Solving Social Problems

Deliberation is also a means for joint resolution of social problems. Of course problems can be resolved in top-down, technocratic fashion; or allocated to quasi-market mechanisms. But a large public policy literature points to the effectiveness of deliberation on the part of those concerned with a common problem in generating solutions that are both effective and mutually acceptable (see for example Innes & Booher, 2003) – and which can work when top-down solutions are resisted by those whose interests and arguments are overridden. This is not the place to assess the effectiveness of deliberation in comparison with its alternatives in social problem-solving. But as long as some degree of pluralism of perspectives is seen as instrumental to effective decision (a staple of liberal democracy), deliberation can help generate mutual acceptance of the credibility of disputed beliefs. Such mutual acceptance ought to be promoted to the degree actors try to state positions, and supporting beliefs, in terms acceptable to actors on the other side of an issue. Again, reciprocity comes into play. The absence of such acceptance means the other side is seen as trafficking in falsehoods – rather than a different perspective on common problems. Such alleged falsehoods might concern economic doctrines (Marxist or market liberal), interpretations of history (identifying oppressors, liberators, friends, and enemies), or theories about the impact of policy.

Reflexivity

Elster, Offe, and Preuss (1998) liken the democratization and marketization of postcommunist systems to ‘rebuilding the ship at sea’ – as opposed to the construction of a new ship from a set of plans. One aspect of deliberative capacity is a distributed ability to reflect critically on preferences, including preferences about the structure of the political system itself. Thus deliberative capacity ought to promote the ability of a system to identify its own shortcomings and further reform itself. Without this ability, reformers may be tempted by more authoritarian pathways. The anti-deliberationist Adam Przeworski (1991, p. 183) inadvertently puts the issue into stark perspective when he states that post-transition economic reforms ‘are based on a model of economic efficiency that is highly technical. They involve choices that are not easy to explain to the general public and decisions that do not always make sense to popular opinion”. Similarly, Brucan (1992, p. 24) argues that ‘A reform policy is not one that emerges from broad participation, from a consensus among all the affected interests, from compromises’. Przeworski and Brucan may be right; but only to the extent the society in question lacks deliberative capacity.

This reflexive quality may be enhanced inasmuch as the experience of deliberation itself increases the competence of political actors. There is some evidence that participating in a deliberative forum has an enduring effect on the political efficacy of citizen-participants (Delli Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004, p. 334). However, this evidence to date comes mainly from deliberative polls in developed democracies, so it is not clear how generalizable the effect is – nor whether the effect extends to partisan political actors, as opposed to ordinary citizens.

#### Turns case—supplanting dialogue to protest oppression leads to even worse forms of authority

**Morson 4**

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

### A2 t = arbitrary

#### All definitions are somewhat arbitrary, but this proves limits are key. The only solution is contesting reasonable interpretations of terms—means T debates solve their offense

**Kemerling 97** (Garth, professor of philosophy at Newberry College, http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm)

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. **Needless controversy is** sometimes **produced** and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts: Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely verbal disputes, on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can. Kinds of Definition The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of languages is by agreeing on the definition of our terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A lexical definition simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a stipulative definition freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to reduce the vagueness of a word or phrase. These precising definitions begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to **sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits** on its use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness. If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

## 1NR

### Case

#### Energy POLICY matters and we need policy action to address the pressing energy needs of the US and the world

Wirth, Gray & Podesta, very qualified, ‘3 The Future of Energy Policy Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush. John D. Podesta is Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and served as Chief of Staff to former President Bill Clinton. Volume 82 • Number 4 Foreign Affairs 2003 Council on Foreign Relations

The big questions A century ago, Lord Selborne, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty, dismissed the idea of fueling the British navy with something other than coal, which the island nation had in great abundance. “The substitution of oil for coal is impossible,” he pronounced, “because oil does not exist in this world in su⁄cient quantities.” Seven years later, the young Winston Churchill was appointed ﬁrst lord and charged with winning the escalating Anglo-German race for naval superiority. As Daniel Yergin chronicled in The Prize, Churchill saw that oil would increase ship speed and reduce refueling time—key strategic advantages—and ordered oil-burning battleships to be built, committing the navy to this new fuel. Churchill’s was a strategic choice, bold, creative, and farsighted. The energy choices the world faces today are no less consequential, and America’s response must be as insightful. Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and national security. In fact, the complex ties between energy and U.S. national interests have drawn tighter over time. The advent of globalization, the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, and the need to safeguard the earth’s environment are all intertwined with energy concerns. The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challenges of the twenty-ﬁrst century warrant recognizing energy’s central role in America’s future and the need for much more ambitious and creative approaches. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainly about tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, and nuances of electricity regulation difficult issues all, but inadequate for the larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy dialogue reﬂects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to the issues it affects: defense and homeland security, the economy, and the environment. What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy, not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists. U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The ﬁrst is the danger to political and economic security posed by the world’s dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the global environment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustion of fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world’s poor to modern energy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics needed for economic advancement is a deep concern. None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices. The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted policy interventions that build on the power of the market, publicprivate partnerships in ﬁnancing and technology development, and, perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy interests that have so far engaged only in conﬂict. Turning this ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment of the United States’ critical energy challenges and the interests that can be mobilized for the necessary political change.

#### Some degree of managerialism is inevitable – they attempt to manage the environment just by saying we should affirm unrestricted energy to preclude environmental catastrophe – admitting this and submitting to some degree of technocratic planning is key

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Neil, “Discourses of the Environment,” ed: Eric Darier, p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are, nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for space, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse or at least limit the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behavior towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207).in fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impact which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the hate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided?

#### This theory of language fails -- the composition of the Sign is cultural, not psychological

**Holland '98** (Norman, Prof emeritius @ florida, “The Trouble(s) with Lacan” <http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/nholland/lacan.htm>)

Lacan presents psycholinguistic problems as well as linguistic. Even if Chomsky were all wrong, Lacan has made a still more fundamental error in psychologizing Saussure's account of language. Over and over again, Lacan claims that linguistic entities are in fact psychological entities. The most notorious instance where he converts a linguistic entity to a psychological one is, of course, signifier and signified. Lacan identifies the signifier pretty with the conscious and Saussure's signified with Freud's unconscious. Then the linguistic barre that Saussure posited between signifier and signified, Lacan equates to Freud's repression. As we have seen, Lacan approximates Jakobson's metonymy (roughly, sequence) and Jakobson's metaphor (roughly, substitution) to Freud's "condensation" and "displacement," and in turn to other linguists' "syntagm" and "paradigm." In other words, what he does is say that these linguistic entitities are in fact psychological entities. Similarly, the barre Saussure posited between signifier and signified comes to equal Freud's repression. The linguist's barre becomes the psychoanalyst's bar between conscious and unconscious, and the signifier cannot cross it. The hidden signifieds are the unconscious, and the signifiers are the "empty speech" with which we try to express, as in free associations, our real (unconscious) selves. We necessarily fail, because signifiers signify other signifiers, not signifieds. Conscious and unconscious are thus opposed in one of Lacan's two-valued systems. In effect, Lacan renders all psychic determinism as the single linguistic process of a signifier signifying other signifiers. That's quite a role for a process that modern linguists doubt even exists.

### AT: Perm

#### Perm fails – start from fluidity

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Social workers need to understand that, while the roots of oppression may be linked to fixed identities, this **does not have to be the case for responses against that oppression; one can still empower oneself against oppression by starting from a fluid identity**. Transgender individuals can be empowered to create their own identities outside the socially constructed binary gender boxes. Beyond empowerment, transgender theory provides an alternative to feminist and queer theories in addressing the thorny issue of coalition building for social activism in an intersectional world. Feminist theory’s premise is centered on the ongoing struggle for gender equality. Several authors (e.g., Bettcher, 2010; Heyes, 2003), however, have noted that many feminists have regarded transgenders as either gender betrayers or pretenders, and Bettcher (2010) presented a history of the exclusion of transgenders from women’s consciousness events. Transsexuals who choose to transition from one sex to another are seen as reiterating the sexist model by seeming to move ‘‘effortlessly’’ to the other box. In this, FTMs are considered traitors because they have gained male power without earning it and have turned their backs on women’s oppression. MTFs are also traitors for trying to call themselves real women with embodied experiences, although they have not experienced oppression throughout their lives, as many women have. Such exclusions are problematic for both transgenders and women who are working to challenge gender and other social identity oppressions. For transgenders, such exclusion robs them of affiliations with nontransgender women, who would seem to be natural allies in opposing the sexism that is commonly experienced by both groups. For nontransgender women, transgenders provide a unique perspective on the nature of gender oppression and how to resist it. By creating the obstacle that MTFs cannot be a part of women’s coalitions, nontransgender woman are ultimately **solidifying the gender** **binary** that oppresses women in the context of power differentials with men.

 In addressing these issues, the transgender theory approach to intersectional identities provides a general framework for coalition building across multiple oppressed social identities. Clearly, building coalitions between transgenders and nontransgender feminist women should be seen as not only possible but highly desirable. The feminist relational model of Shotwell and Sangrey (2009) makes the point that any outside imposition of a social identity on an individual is a form of oppression, whereas the self-assertion of a social identity forces those outside that identity to consider what it means to have or not have that identity. Thus, feminist nontransgender women’s exclusion of MTFs as not being ‘‘real’’ women and their view of FTMs as ‘‘traitors’’ is a form of oppression, whereas the self-assertion of a transgender identity forces those who are not transgenders to have to understand the nature of this identity. The implication of these ideas is that membership in coalitions for resisting oppression should be based on the experience of oppression—how social forces coerce individuals into fitting into social identity boxes with prescribed expectations for social appearance and functioning—not on the degree of self-identification that an individual has with the oppressed group. Such an approach recognizes and draws strength from the commonalities of individuals with multiple, intersectional oppressed social identities.